我院葛秋辰博士与中央财经大学吴溪教授、澳门大学肖泽忠（Jason Xiao）教授、香港大学邹宏（Hong Zou）教授合作撰写的学术论文“Independent Director Dissent, Shareholder Voting, and RealChanges to Corporate Actions: Evidence From China”（《独立董事异议、股东投票与公司行动的实际变化：来自中国的证据》）在《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》在线发表。

论文摘要：

While independent director (ID) dissent on management proposals at board meetings has been shown to be a valuable signal tothe capital market, little is known about whether and how ID dissent alters corporate actions through shareholder voting. Usingdata from China between 2004 and 2023, we find that ID dissent prompts shareholders to cast more dissenting votes, resulting inmore vetoed proposals. This effect is primarily driven by shareholder “against” votes (rather than abstentions) responding to ID“against” votes (rather than ID abstentions), reflecting that shareholders value clear dissent signals. In a subsample of proposalswhere retail investor voting is mandated to be separately counted, we find that retail investors, rather than blockholders, respondto ID “against” votes. Among proposals that encounter ID dissent yet pass shareholder approval, we find that greater shareholderdissent—especially in the form of “against” votes—predicts a higher likelihood that management will address ID concerns in thesubsequent year. Our evidence demonstrates that beyond signaling to the market, ID dissent can shape real corporate actions byprompting outside shareholders to voice their concerns more loudly and clearly—even in an emerging market context.

教师简介：

葛秋辰，讲师，浙江财经大学会计学院审计系，主要从事中小投资者保护、注册会计师审计的相关研究。